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Kowal v. Ellis: A Comment
In Kowal v. E llu 1 the Manitoba Court of Appeal was called upon 
to deal with an unsettled area of the law; namely, the right of an 
occupier o f land to claim a chattel found lying loose on his land as 
against one who claims the chattel as a finder.
Briefly, the facts were that the plaintiff took possession of a pump, 
valued at $450, that was lying unattached on the defendant’s land. 
The defendant took the pum p from the plaintiff and the plaintiff 
succeeded in the County Court and again in the Court of Appeal in 
asserting a superior claim to the chattel. The reasoning of the Court of 
Appeal raises several questions.
In delivering the judgem ent of the Court, O’Sullivan J. stated, “I start 
from the premise that a finder of a chattel, who takes it into his possession, 
becomes a bailee by finding . . . .”2 The statement in itself is unassailable. 
What is questionable, however, is whether this should be the premise 
from which one starts. The premise presupposes that the plaintiff is a 
finder and this, it seems, finesses the fundamental question; namely, is the 
plaintiff a finder at all?
The defendant’s claim rests on the fact that he is the occupier of 
the land on which the pum p was found. Certainly there is authority for 
saying that “. . . if something is found on that land . . . the presumption 
is that the possession of that thing is in the owner of the locus in quo.”3
Since the pum p in question was an unattached chattel, a presumption 
in favour of possession by the defendant occupier is raised, and such a 
presumption is rebuttable. Failing rebuttal, the defendant can assert a 
claim anterior to that of the plaintiff. The occupier’s claim is that 
because o f his possession of the locus in quo he has possession of things 
thereon whether he knows of those things or not. As one learned 
author has put it:
. . .  I control some parts o f  my land; in doing so, I am presumed — unless 
there be evidence to the contrary — to intend to control all o f  it; my possession 
thus comes to pervade the whole o f the land, extending to things in the area o f  
my possession that I may not even know to exist.4
*South Staffordshire Water Co. v. Sharman, [1896] 2 Q.B. 44, at 47 (per Lord Russell).
‘A.E.S. Tay, Possession and the Modem Law of Finding, (1962-4) 4 Sydney L. R. 383, at 389.
'(1977), 76 D.L.R. (3d) 546 (Man. C.A.).
*lbul., at 547.
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The learned judge rejected the notion that there was any prior 
control in the defendant because he did not assert dominion and control 
over the pump itself.5 It is, with deference, suggested that the occupier’s 
claim does not rest on an assertion o f control of the chattel, which 
would require knowledge of the pum p, but rather it rests on control of 
the land. The intention is to control the land and indirectly the things 
on it whether known to him or not.
In canvassing a num ber of well-known authorities in support of 
his conclusions, O’Sullivan J. quoted from Armory v. Delamirie8 where it 
was said:
That the finder o f  a jewel, though he does not by such finding acquire an 
absolute property or ownership, yet he has such a property as will enable him 
to keep it against all but the rightful owner, and consequently may maintain 
trover.7
The learned judge went on to say:
If that proposition is understood as intended to cover the case, not o f  a mere 
finder but o f  a finder who has taken a chattel into his possession I think it 
expresses in a nutshell the law applicable to the facts o f  the case before us.8
With respect it is submitted that neither the facts, nor the reasoning, 
in Armory v. Delamirie throw light on the present controversy.
In Armory v. Delamirie a chimney sweep who had found a jewelled 
ring took it to a jeweller to have it valued; the jeweller’s apprentice 
who received the ring for this purpose removed the jewel and refused 
to return it. In finding for the cnimney sweep the Court recognized 
the rights of a possessor against anyone except a previous possessor.
The question in Kowal v. Ellis is whether the defendant’s right to 
possession precedes any claim by the plaintiff.
To support the plaintiffs claim further, O ’Sullivan J. relied on 
the celebrated case of Bridges v. Hawksiuorth,9 where it was stated that 
as a general rule of law “. . . the finder o f a lost article is entitled to 
it as against all parties except the real owner.”10
There are two reasons why this proposition is inapplicable to the 
present case. First, unless the presumption in favour of the defendant
*Sufna, footnote 1, at 549.
•(1722), 93 E.R. 664.
7lbuL
*Supra, footnote 1, at 548.
•(1851), 21 L.J. Q.B. 75.
'•IM .. at 79.
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is rebutted, the plaintiff is not a finder because there is no lack of de 
facto control at the moment of finding. Second, the chattel was not lost.
The learned judge acknowledged that “[t]he pum p in question 
appears to have been cached rather than abandoned.”11 If indeed it was 
hidden on the defendant’s property then two consequences may flow. 
The real owner of the chattel either still had an intention toward it 
and had not abandoned it, or the defendant had control over it because 
of his control of the land. On either analysis it is clear that the plaintiff 
could not have been a finder.
It is interesting that in Bridges v. Hawksworth, Patterson J., in 
discussing the notes found by the plaintiff on the floor of the defendant’s 
shop said, “The notes never were in the custody of the defendant, nor 
within the protection o f his house before they were found, as they 
would have been had they been intentionally deposited there. . . .”12
That statement implies that there is a difference between things 
hidden and things lost on the occupier’s premises. In the form er the 
occupier does have a responsibility; in the latter he does not. It is 
therefore submitted that as the pum p was cached on the defendant’s 
land he had it in his possession whether he knew of it or not.
The interesting argum ent in this case is whether the pum p was 
already in the possession of the defendant because of his occupation 
and effective control of the land on which the pum p was found. If 
it was, then the plaintiff is not a finder at all. Clearly, if the plaintiff 
was not a finder, then nor was he a bailee by finding.
It is disappointing that the Court did not approach the case as one 
raising the question of possession rather than dealing with the issue on 
the basis of rights and duties of bailees by finding.
Had the Court cut through the conceptual limitations o f the earlier 
cases and followed the lead of Lord Russell in South Staffordshire Water 
Co. v. Sharman, 13 where a general conceptual framework for possession 
was established, its approach would have been more in line with the 
reasoning developed more recently.14
Unfortunately, two cases15 which do attempt to place possession 
within a broad conceptual framework were not cited.
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